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Collateral Estoppel and Supreme Court 
Disposition of Moot Cases 
The Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to decide moot cases. 1 A 
case becomes moot when the controversy that originally existed be-
tween the parties terminates before adjudication by the Court.2 The 
Court's disposition of a moot case may determine the collateral es-
toppel effect of the decision below. If the Court simply dismisses the 
case, leaving the lower court judgment undisturbed, collateral estop-
pel may preclude relitigation of issues by the same parties in a subse-
quent suit. If the Court vacates the lower court judgment, it nullifies 
the preclusive effect of that judgment. 3 
When mootness prevents review of a state decision, the Supreme 
Court traditionally permits the state to determine the collateral es-
toppel effect by remanding to the state court for proceedings deemed 
appropriate by that court.4 But when a moot case comes from a fed-
eral court, the Supreme Court usually vacates the lower court judg-
ment and remands the case with directions to dismiss it.5 Under this 
"Munsingwear"6 procedure, federal cases mooted pending Supreme 
I. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 
(1971). 
2. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. at 318-20. 
This Note examines the procedure the Supreme Court should follow in disposing of cases 
once they become moot. The complex issues involved in determining when a case is substan-
tively moot fall beyond its scope. Nevertheless, the "procedural aspects [of mootness] are 
largely intertwined with the substantive," R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRAC-
TICE 885 (5th ed. 1978), and reference to several sources discussing mootness standards should 
inform decisions concerning appropriate mootness procedure. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. 
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533 (1975 & 1980 Supp.); 
Note, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672 (1970). 
3. One might suppose that when a similar dispute is likely to recur between the same par-
ties, judicial economy would be served by resolving issues in the present case rather than 
deferring them to future litigation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has refused to find such cases 
moot. See Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-16 (1911). See generally 
Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373, 380-95 (1974). It is 
only in cases where a dispute recurs despite the apparent improbability of repetition, or where 
a different claim turns on the same issue, see text at note 17 i,!fra, that collateral estoppel, and 
therefore the method of disposing of moot cases, assume importance. 
4. See NAACP v. Committee on Offenses Against the Administration of Justice, 385 U.S. 
40 (1958); Chaisson v. Southcoast Corp., 350 U.S. 899 (1955). 
5. E.g., Hopper v. Barnett, 439 U.S. 1401 (1978); Connecticut State Bd. of Parole v. Bey, 
404 U.S. 879 (1971). See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950) (dictum). In 
Munsingwear, the Supreme Court did not distinguish between cases becoming moot before 
and after its decision on the certiorari petition. The Court used the phrase "a civil case from a 
court in the federal system which has become moot while on its way here or pending our 
decision on the merits." 340 U.S. at 39. 
6. The vacate and remand procedure is commonly referred to as the Munsingwear proce-
dure, after United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950), the case in which the Supreme 
Court first formally embraced this method of disposing of moot cases. 
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Court action have no collateral estoppel effects.7 
Recently, in Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. United States, 8 the Gov-
ernment urged the Supreme Court to follow the Munsingwear proce-
dure only in those federal cases the Court would have considered on 
the merits had the controversy continued.9 The Government argued 
that if the Velsicol case were found moot, the Court should deny 
certiorari without vacating the lower court judgment. Had the case 
not been mooted, the Government contended, the Court would have 
denied certiorari, thereby leaving the court of appeals judgment, and 
its preclusive effects, intact. 10 The Court denied certiorari in Velsicol 
without indicating whether the case was moot, 11 and hence failed to 
formally adopt the Government's proposal. 
In response to the Government's novel proposal in Velsicol, this 
Note reconsiders the procedures by which the Supreme Court could 
dispose of moot cases. Section I examines the collateral estoppel ef-
fects of the Supreme Court's present procedure and the Govern-
ment's proposal in Velsicol. Section II concludes that both 
procedures afford excessive protection from collateral estoppel be-
cause they misconceive the purpose of Supreme Court review. The 
Note suggests that, when faced with a moot federal petition for certi-
orari, the Supreme Court should either deny the petition or, if certio-
rari has already been granted, dismiss the case. 
7. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950) (dictum). 
The doctrines of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and stare decisis are intertwined and often 
confused. This Note examines the collateral estoppel effects of various Supreme Court dispo-
sitions of moot cases, and leaves implications for res judicata and stare decisis to footnotes. 
See notes 24 & 37 infra. 
Collateral estoppel is defined infra at text accompanying note 13. Under the doctrine of 
stare decisis, when one court announces a rule of law in a decision, all other courts owing 
obedience to the first court must apply that rule to cases they hear. Stare decisis applies to later 
lawsuits between the same or different parties. Res judicata bars parties to the first suit from 
relitigating the cause of action of that lawsuit, including any matter that could have been 
decided there. It applies only to parties to the first lawsuit or those in privily with them. See 
1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 0.401, at 11-16 (2d ed. 1974). 
All three effects may accompany one decision: Suppose that A brings an action against B 
for breach of contract made in 1979. B pleads infancy as a defense, and it is proved at trial 
that B was born in 1960. The trial court renders a judgment for B because he was under 21 
when he entered into the contract. The state supreme court reverses the judgment, holding 
that no one over age 18 is an infant for purposes of avoiding a contract. Res judicata precludes 
A, who miscalculated the damages he incurred, from bringing another action on the same 
contract. Under collateral estoppel, B is precluded from relitigating his birth date in a later 
action by A on a different contract. Under stare decisis, eighteen years will be the age of 
infancy for purposes of avoiding contracts in all future actions in the state courts, between A 
and B or any other parties. 
8. 435 U.S. 942 (1978). 
9. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 6, Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. United States, 
435 U.S. 942 (1978). 
10. Id at 4-8. 
11. 435 U.S. at 942. For a description of the Velsicol facts, see note 28 infra. 
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I. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND THE MUNSINGWEAR 
AND VELSICOL PROCEDURES 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel conserves the resources of 
courts and litigants by barring relitigation of previously decided is-
sues: 12 "When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and deter-
mined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is 
essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subse-
quent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different 
claim."13 This "issue preclusion" restrains only those parties who 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior suit. 14 
To the extent that a procedure for disposing of moot cases prevents 
collateral estoppel in subsequent suits, it imposes a burden pn courts 
and litigants by allowing relitigation of issues. 
The federal courts can only consider live controversies; once a 
case becomes moot. it is beyond their jurisdiction. 15 If a case is 
mooted while still in the trial court, the court will dismiss it, leaving 
the parties' legal relations unchanged.16 If the case becomes moot 
during appeal, however, the appellate court's disposition of the case 
may determine the collateral estoppel effect of issues decided in the 
lower court. Consider, for example, this possibility: A union sues an 
employer, seeking an injunction to enforce a collective bargaining 
agreement. The federal district court holds that the agreement vio-
lates federal labor laws, and therefore renders judgment for the em-
ployer. During an appeal by the union, bankruptcy proceedings 
against the employer begin in another court. The circuit court of 
appeals finds the labor case moot because the agreement can no 
longer be enforced against the employer. Unable to review the legal-
ity of the agreement, the court of appeals vacates the district court 
judgment and remands the case with instructions to dismiss as moot. 
This procedure prevents the unreviewed judgment from binding the 
union in bankruptcy court, where it may file a claim for damages for 
breach of the agreement. 17 If the court of appeals did not vacate the 
district court judgment, collateral estoppel would prevent the union 
from relitigating the legality of the agreement in the bankruptcy 
12. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). 
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [hereinafter 
cited as RESTATEMENT 2D.] See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942) [hereinafter 
cited as RESTATEMENT]. 
14. See Huang Tang v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 523 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1975); Zdanok v. Glid-
den Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir. 1964); Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 
2d 601, 606-07, 375 P.2d 439, 441, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 966 
(1963); RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 13, at§ 68.l(e)(iii). 
15. See note 1 supra. 
16. See, e.g., Disabled in Action of Penn., Inc. v. Coleman, 448 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Pa. 
1978); Usery v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Iowa 1976). 
17. These are substantially the facts of Robb v. New York Joint Board, Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers of America, 506 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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court. 18 
In United States v. Munsingwear, 19 the Supreme Court directed 
lower federal appellate courts to vacate and remand for dismissal all 
moot cases coming before them.20 This procedure, observed the 
court, "eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented 
through happenstance."21 Consistent with the common-law rule that 
collateral estoppel should not attach to an unreviewed judgment,22 
the Court commanded a procedure that denies collateral estoppel ef-
fects to all district court judgments mooted before appellate review. 
Had the Court stopped there, its Munsingwear decision might have 
correctly balanced the need to protect appellants in moot cases from 
collateral estoppel and the conservation of judicial resources pro-
moted by collateral estoppel. Unfortunately, dictum in the Munsing-
wear opinion extended the vacate-and-remand procedure one step 
further. 
Although the Munsingwear case involved disposition of a moot 
case by a court of appeals, the Supreme Court added that its own 
procedure was the same: "The established practice of the Court in 
dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal system which has 
become moot while on its way here or pending our decision on the 
merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a 
18. See Goldsmith v. M. Jackman & Sons, Inc., 327 F.2d 184, 185 (10th Cir. 1964); Paull v. 
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 313 F.2d 612, 617 (8th Cir. 1963). 
19. 340 U.S. 36 (1950). 
20. 340 U.S. at 39-40 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U.S. 259, 267 
(1936)). 
In Munsingwear, the Government brought an action for violations of regulations that fixed 
maximum prices. The parties agreed to try the suit for an injunction first and hold a treble 
damages count in abeyance. The district court held that Munsingwear had complied with the 
regulations, and it dismissed the count seeking an injunction. 
While appeal by the Government was pending, the price ceilings were lifted. The court of 
appeals dismissed the appeal as moot, leaving the district court judgment intact. The district 
court then dismissed the treble damages count; under collateral estoppel, the Government was 
bound by the unreversed judgment in the injunction suit. 
It was this dismissal that the Supreme Court upheld in United States v. Munsingwear, 340 
U.S. 36 (1950). The Court held that because the Government had made no motion to vacate 
the judgment when it appealed the dismissal of the injunction count, it must now be bound by 
the judgment. This holding was criticized in Developments in the Law - Res Judicata, 65 
HARV. L. REV. 818,848 (1952) (suggesting that a court in a subsequent action should not give 
the judgment collateral estoppel effect even if the appeal in the first action were merely dis-
missed as moot). 
21. 340 U.S. at 40. Although the Munsingwear Court emphasized mootness through "hap-
penstance," proof that petitioners caused the case to be mooted apparently does not warrant 
preclusion. See New Left Educ. Project v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Texas Sys., 472 
F.2d 218 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded for dismissal as moot, 414 U.S. 807 (1973). 
22. SeeREsTATEMENT 2D, supra note 13, at§ 68.l(a). The right to appeal may be limited 
in some jurisdictions to cases involving more than a minimum dollar amount. See 4 AM. JuR. 
2D, Appeal and Error§§ 20-23 (1962). The unappealable judgment in one case could preclude 
relitigation of an issue in another case if the amounts involved in both cases fell short of the 
minimum. 
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direction to dismiss."23 Such a practice preserves the petitioner's 
chance to relitigate issues never addressed by the Supreme Court,24 
but it sacrifices the resources of courts and respondents who must 
retry issues already decided in the respondent's favor by an appellate 
court. These sacrifices led directly to the Ve!sico! proposal for alter-
ing the Supreme Court's Munsingwear procedure. Nevertheless, the 
dictum in Munsingwear remains the sole Supreme Court statement 
on the issue in the last thirty years. 
In Ve!sico! Chemical Corporation v. United States,25 the Govern-
ment questioned whether the Munsingwear procedure was appropri-
ate in cases becoming moot before the Supreme Court decides 
whether to grant certiorari.26 After a federal court of appeals de-
cided against Velsicol,27 the case was apparently mooted. Velsicol 
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, requesting that the 
Court follow the Munsingwear procedure in order to preclude collat-
eral estoppel effects from the unreviewed court of appeals judg-
ment.28 The Government opposed Velsicol's petition, arguing that 
23. 340 U.S. at 39 (footnote omitted). 
24. Although vacation of the lower court judgment precludes collateral estoppel, the 
court's decision continues to carry weight as a matter of stare decisis. See Hirsch v. Pick-Mt. 
Laurel Corp., 436 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D.N.J. 1977) and Hirsch v. Local 1694, Intl. Long-
shoremen's Assn., 430 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (D. Del. 1977) (both citing as precedent Sarnoff v. 
Building and Constr. Trades Council, 475 F.2d 203 (3d Cir.), vacated and remanded for dismis-
sal as moot, 414 U.S. 808 (1973)); East Tenn. Tenants' Assn. Fairview Chapter v. Harris, 82 
F.R.D. 204, 206 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (citing as precedent Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 
459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated and remanded for dismissal as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972)); 
American Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 235 F.2d 845, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (citing as pre-
cedent Eastern Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 185 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1950), vacated and 
remanded far dismissal as moot, 341 U.S. 901 (1951)); Richardson v. United States, 273 F.2d 
144, 147 n.l (8th Cir. 1959) ("We do not believe the action taken by the Supreme Court [vaca-
tion of the judgment for mootness in a certain case) in any way impairs the weight to be given 
our decision in that case"). 
But if. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), where the Supreme Court vacated a 
judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to that court, saying: "Of necessity 
our decision vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court's opinion of 
precedential effect, leaving this Court's opinion and judgment as the sole law of the case. See 
United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36." 422 U.S. at 577 n.12. By "precedential effect" the 
Court presumably meant the law to be applied when issues reappeared in the same action and 
not stare decisis effect in other cases. Nevertheless, this phrase was quoted in County of Los 
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634 n.6 (1979), where it almost necessarily, though mistakenly, 
referred to stare decisis. 
25. 435 U.S. 942 (1978). 
26. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 4-8. The Government conceded the suita-
bility of the Munsingwear procedure in cases becoming moot after grant of certiorari. Id. at 5. 
27. Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Parsons, 561 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 
942 (1978). 
28. Brief for United States, supra note 9, at 4-8. Velsicol was trying to prevent certain 
evidence from being presented to a grand jury investigating the corporation's conduct in pro-
ceedings before the Environmental Protection Agency. Velsicol claimed that the evidence was 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product rule. Petition for Writ of Certi-
orari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at 6-12, Velsicol Chem. 
Corp. v. United States, 435 U.S. 942 (1978). After losing in both the district court and the 
court of appeals, Velsicol was unable to get a stay of judgment from either the court of appeals 
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the Supreme Court would have denied certiorari had the controversy 
continued, and that it would therefore be unfair to vacate the judg-
ment.29 The Government suggested an alternative to the Munsing-
wear procedure in cases mooted after circuit court review: the 
Supreme Court should decide whether it would have granted the pe-
tition for certiorari had the case not been mooted. Where the Court 
would have denied the petition, it should still deny it despite moot-
ness, thereby preserving collateral estoppel e.ff ects of the lower court 
judgments. Where the Court would have granted the petition, the 
Court should follow the Munsingwear vacate-and-remand proce-
dure.30 
The Government's Velsicol proposal met strong opposition from 
the petitioner and silence from the Court. Velsicol dubbed the pro-
cedure "completely unprecedented," "new-fangled," and "a depar-
ture from ... uniform practice."31 In both Velsicol and Local 102, 
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. United States,32 a 
1979 case in which the Government again urged the new proce-
dure,33 the Court denied the certiorari petitions and left the lower 
court decisions intact. The Court may have either adopted the Vel-
sicol procedure without announcement, or simply found that the 
cases were not moot. The Court should remedy the resulting uncer-
tainty: express reconsideration of the appropriate disposition of 
moot cases would help both to inform the legal community and to 
reform present practice. 
The controversy surrounding disposition of moot cases reflects 
the tension between conserving judicial resources and ensuring that 
parties have a full and fair opportunity to litigate disputes. The doc-
or the Circuit Justice. Brief for United States, supra note 9, at 3. By the time the petition for 
certiorari was filed, the challenged evidence had been presented to the grand jury. Presuma-
bly, Velsicol feared the Government would raise the judgment to prevent litigation of the 
privilege questions at trial. 
29. Brief for United States, supra note 9, at 4-6. . 
30. Brief for United States, supra note 9, at 6. The Goverµment also suggested that where 
mootness was uncertain, the Court, if it otherwise would have granted the petition, should 
remand the case to the court of appeals to decide whether a live controversy remained. In 
cases where mootness was discovered after the petition had been granted, the Court should 
vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint. Id at 5. 
In certain classes of federal cases, losers in lower courts have an appeal of right to the 
Supreme Court. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 2, at§§ 2.5-.7 (appeals from courts 
of appeals); id at§§ 2.9-.10, 2.12-.15 (appeals from district courts). If one of those cases be-
came moot after judgment was rendered below but before the appeal was decided, the Velsicol 
procedure would require the Court to vacate the judgment and remand the case for dismissal 
as moot. 
31. Petitioner's Reply Memorandum at I, 2, 4, Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. United States, 435 
U.S. 942 (1978). But see Perlstein v. Hiatt, 328 U.S. 822 (1946) (dismissal for mootness of a 
petition for certiorari previously granted, without vacating the judgment). 
32. 439 U.S. 1070 (1979). 
33. See Memorandum for the United States in Opposition at 4 n.4, Local 102, Intl. Ladies' 
Garment Workers Union v. United States, 439 U.S. 1070 (1979). 
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trine of collateral estoppel promotes judicial economy: it precludes 
courts and litigants from spending resources to relitigate matters tha1 
have already been decided.34 The mootness doctrine serves judicial 
economy as well: adjudication of moot cases consumes scarce re-
sources that could be better spent resolving live disputes.35 When 
the Supreme Court confronts a case mooted following circuit court 
review, it can therefore achieve a double economy by refusing to 
consider the merits of the case and by preserving the collateral estop-
pel effects of judgments in the lower courts. In Munsingwear, the 
court refused to take full advantage of this economy, apparently be-
cause it felt opportunity for Supreme Court review was a necessary 
component of the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" required 
before collateral estoppel can apply.36 As a result, issues decided by 
a federal circuit court in a subsequently mooted case can always be 
relitigated in a later suit, consuming judicial resources at both the 
trial and appellate levels.37 
The proposed Ve!sico! procedure would preserve most of the 
lower federal court resources sacrificed under the Munsingwear pro-
cedure. Since the Supreme Court denies certiorari in the vast major-
ity _ of cases,38 the Ve!sico! procedure would probably extend 
collateral estoppel effects to judgments in most cases mooted after 
circuit court review. Unfortunately, the Ve!sico! procedure requires 
34. See 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 7, ~ 0.441 [2] at 3779. Collateral 
estoppel may also serve to protect the integrity of the judicial process from the embarrassment 
of inconsistent adjudications. 
35. See Kates & Barker, Mootness in Judicial Proceedings: Toward a Coherent Theory, 62 
CALIF. L. Rev. 1385, 1472 (1974); Note, supra note 3, at 374. 
36. 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950). 
37. One commentator has argued that the Munsingwear procedure also interferes with the 
res judicata effect of judgments. See Comment, JJisposition of Moot Cases by the United States 
Supreme Court, 23 U. CHI. L. Rev. 77, 92-93 (1955). Res judicata bars parties from raising 
claims that could have been settled in a prior suit: ''The law of res judicata •.• reflects the 
expectation that parties who are given the capacity to present their 'entire controversies' shall 
in fact do so." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 61, comment a at 80-81 (Tent. Draft 
No. 1, 1973). Yet the Munsingwear procedure permits litigants to bring a claim in a second suit 
that could more conveniently have been adjudicated in the first, thereby further taxing judicial 
resources. 
The Court could modify the Munsingwear procedure to prevent such a result by vacating 
the judgment and remanding with instructions to dismiss with prejudice. The petitioner could 
then relitigate the issue but not the cause of action. As a second alternative, the Supreme 
Court could merely deny the petition for certiorari as moot, leaving it up to later courts to give 
the proper preclusive effects. See Note, Res Judicata Effects of JJismissing an Appeal as Moot, 
50 CoLUM. L. Rev. 716, 719 (1950). A judgment left standing by such a denial of certiorari 
would be given normal res judicata effect, and, except on issues raised in the petition, normal 
collateral estoppel effect. C.f. Comment, supra, at 92-93 ("In the absence of factors recom-
mending reversal or vacation of the lower decree, it is suggested that all moot appeals to the 
Supreme Court ought to be dismissed so as to gain whatever res judicata benefits there may 
be"). 
38. Of the 2496 petitions filed from July, 1978, through June, 1979, only 142 were granted, 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR A-5 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. Actually, some of the petitions granted were among 
those 622 pending on June 30, 1978. On June 30, 1979, 589 petitions were pending. Similar 
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sacrifice of Supreme Court resources to achieve the savings of collat-
eral estoppel below. The Velsicol procedure requires the Supreme 
Court to determine the "certworthiness" of moot petitions in most 
cases. Although some petitions might be easily decided,39 others 
wo~ld call for sustained study.40 And since many moot cases involve 
issues that the parties will never relitigate regardless of how the 
Court disposes of the case, much of the time the Justices spend de-
ciding the certworthiness of moot cases would be wasted.41 The case 
for the Velsico! procedure therefore seems less than compelling, even 
if we assume that conserving judicial resources is the only goal of 
mootness procedure. 
The-Government could have made an alternative and more per-
suasive argument in Velsicol. Instead of asking the Justices to spend 
their valuable time reviewing the certworthiness of cases they can 
not consider on the merits,42 the Government should have chal-
lenged the underlying assumption of the Munsingwear procedure: 
that the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" prerequisite for collat-
eral estoppel must include an opportunity for Supreme Court review. 
The historic purpose of Supreme Court review calls that assumption 
into question. And if a full and fair opportunity to litigate does not 
include Supreme Court review, there remains no reason to deny col-
lateral estoppel to judgments in cases mooted after review by the 
circuit courts of appeal. 
II. A MOOTNESS PROCEDURE CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES 
OF SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
In Munsingwear, the Supreme Court concluded that parties 
should not suffer collateral estoppel if mootness denies them any 
stage of appellate review of an unfavorable judgment. Munsingwear 
ratios of about 5-7% have prevailed in the recent past. See G. CASPER & R. POSNER, THE 
WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 59 (1976). 
Certiorari is granted upon affirmative votes of four or more Justices. See R. STERN & E. 
GRESSMAN, supra note 2, at § 5.4. 
39. Associate Justice William Brennan has observed that: "In a substantial percentage of 
cases I find that I need read only the 'Questions Presented' to decide how I will dispose of the 
case." Brennan, The National Court ef Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 473, 477 
(1973). 
40. See Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword· The Time CharteftheJustices, 
73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 88 (1959). 
41. If the Court were to decide a moot case on the merits, it could at least prevent further 
litigation that uncertainty in the law can cause. See Kates & Barker, supra note 35, at 1429-3 l. 
By contrast, the Court's decision regarding certworthiness under the Velsicol procedure would 
affect only the parties to the lawsuit, and would permit uncertainty to continue. An appropri-
ate compromise might be to modify the Velsicol procedure so that the Court would deny moot 
certiorari petitions only when they obviously would not have merited review absent mootness. 
If there is any possibility that the petition would have been granted, the Court would vacate 
the judgment, and remand for dismissal. 
42. See note l supra and accompanying texL 
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prescribed the same procedure for disposition of moot cases in cir-
cuit courts, where appeal of right is the rule, as in the Supreme 
Court, where review is usually discretionary and appeal of right is 
the rare exception.43 The Supreme Court's power to choose which 
cases it will hear suggests that the purpose of Supreme Court review 
differs from the purpose of review by the circuit courts. That differ-
ence in purpose should inform the Court's definition of what consti-
tutes a "full and fair opportunity to litigate." This Section argues 
that, since the primary purpose of Supreme Court review is to estab-
lish general principles of law rather than to do justice between the 
particular parties in a case, Supreme Court review« should not be 
considered part of the full and fair opportunity to litigate requisite 
before collateral estoppel can attach to a lower court judgment. 
Once a federal district court decides a case, appellate review pro-
motes the interests both of particular litigants and of society in gen-
eral. Review protects the litigants from erroneous lower court 
rulings as to their rights and duties. More generally, review enables 
superior courts to modify and expand the law as society changes and 
to assure uniformity of law within a jurisdiction.45 An appellate de-
cision, whether rendered in the Supreme Court or in a court of ap-
peals, inevitably affects both the litigants in the case at issue and the 
entire jurisdiction bound by stare decisis to follow the decision. Al-
though review at each level produces both effects, the purpose of re-
view changes when a case moves from a circuit court to the Supreme 
Court. 
A central purpose of circuit court review is to do justice between 
particular litigants. Congress has provided that litigants may appeal 
all final decisions of federal district courts.46 A litigant unhappy 
with the final decision of a district court almost without exception47 
has recourse to a circuit court of appeals. This universal opportunity 
43. Federal statutes require the Court to review lower court interpretations of federal law 
in some cases, including those in which a federal statute is held unconstitutional, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1252 (1976), and those in which a state statute is held repugnant to federal law, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1254(2) (1976). In the 1971-72 Term, only 8.5% of the cases docketed in the Supreme Court 
were within the obligatory appeals jurisdiction of the Court. See REPORT, supra note 38, at A-
8. 
44. As used in the remainder of this Note, "Supreme Court review" includes both the 
decision whether to grant the certiorari petition and the deliberations on the merits of the case 
after certiorari is granted. 
45. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2-3 (1976); 
Kurland, Jurisdiction in the United Stales Supreme Court: Time far a Change?, 59 CORNELL L. 
REV. 617, 618-19 (1974). 
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). 
47. In a few narrow classes of cases, litigants can appeal a district court judgment directly 
to the Supreme Court. See, eg., 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976) (allowing direct appeal when a dis-
trict court holds a federal statute unconstitutional in any civil action to which the United States 
is a party); 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976) (allowing direct appeal from certain decisions of a three-
judge district court panel). For a thorough discussion, see R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra 
note 2, at§§ 2.9-.15. 
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to appeal suggests that Congress believes a first appeal to be part of 
the minimum procedure due every litigant.48 Further, it suggests 
that a litigant denied all opportunity to appeal by reason of mootness 
has not enjoyed the full and fair opportunity to litigate that is re-
quired before collateral estoppel can attach to a lower court judg-
ment. When a circuit court of appeals vacates a district court 
judgment in a moot case and remands the case for dismissal, it there-
fore protects litigants from unwarranted collateral estoppel effects.49 
Correcting injustices suffered by particular litigants is a much less 
central purpose when the Supreme Court reviews circuit court deci-
sions. Although Supreme Court decisions alter the rights and duties 
of parties to the case at issue, that effect is but an incidental step 
toward achieving a much more important purpose of Supreme Court 
review: to develop uniform national rules of law that meet the needs 
of a changing society. Chief Justice Taft best explained this general 
purpose of Supreme Court review: 
No litigant is entitled to more than two chances, namely to the origi-
nal trial and to a review, and the intermediate courts of review are 
provided for that purpose. When a case goes beyond that, it is not 
primarily to preserve the rights of the litigants. The Supreme Court's 
function is for the purpose of expounding and stabilizing principles of 
law for the benefit of the people of the country, passing upon constitu-
tional questions and other important questions of law for the public 
benefit. It is to preserve uniformity of decisions among the intermedi-
ate courts of appeal.so 
Taft's words suggest that the opportunity for Supreme Court review 
is a privilege bestowed solely because it benefits the public generally; 
it is not an essential element of a particular party's full and fair op-
portunity to litigate. 
This conclusion seems especially compelling in cases falling 
. within the Court's discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. Supreme 
Court Rule 17 illustrates the more general purposes the Supreme 
Court considers in deciding when to grant certiorari: 
A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and impor-
tant reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor 
fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons 
that will be considered. 
(a) When a federal court of appeals has rendered a decision in con-
48. Cf. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 257-58 
(1928) (discussing establishment of courts of appeals as courts of last resort for "ordinary" 
cases as opposed to cases "fit" for Supreme Court review). 
49. This procedure is consistent with the co=on-law rule denying collateral estoppel ef-
fects to unreviewed judgments. See text at note 22 supra. 
50. Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on H.R. 
10479, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1922), quoted in Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 
452 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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flict with the decision of another federal court of appeals on the 
same matter; or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict 
with a state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the ac-
cepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned 
such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise _of this 
Court's power of supervision. 
(b) When a state court oflast resort has decided a federal question 
in a way in conflict with the decision of another state court of last 
resort or of a federal court of appeals. 
(c) When a state court or a federal court of appeals has decided an 
important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by the Court, or has decided a federal question in a way in 
conflict with applicable decisions of this Court.51 
Indeed, "the major purpose of a certiorari petition is to demonstrate 
that the case is . . . of sufficient general significance, and not simply 
of importance to the parties in the case, to warrant review."52 
The Supreme Court very rarely grants a certiorari petition out of 
concern for injustice suffered by a particular party below.53 Instead, 
the vast majority of petitioners are denied review for reasons unre-
lated to their personal merits, and a small minority gain review 
solely because their case affords an opportunity to address an impor-
tant national legal issue.54 For no merit of their own, a few petition-
ers receive a third chance to litigate their dispute; for no fault of their 
own, a few respondents must litigate yet a third time. Because the 
decision to grant a petition for certiorari is infrequent and substan-
tially unrelated to the degree of injustice suffered by a particular pe-
titioner, Supreme Court review of the petition surpasses the 
collateral estoppel requirement of a full and fair opportunity to liti-
gate. A petitioner whose case is mooted after review in a circuit 
court, but before the Supreme Court considers his petition, therefore 
loses a slim chance at Supreme Court review but has already enjoyed 
a full opportunity to litigate his dispute. Collateral estoppel should 
therefore attach to circuit court judgments in cases mooted before 
Supreme Court review. 55 
Some might argue that the chance of gaining Supreme Court re-
51. SUP. CT. R. 17 (1980). 
52. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 72 (9th ed. 1975), 
See also Address by Chief Justice Vinson Before the American Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1949, 
69 Sup. Ct. v, vi-vii ("A petition for certiorari should explain why it is vital that the question 
involved be decided finally by the Supreme Court. If it only succeeds in demonstrating that 
the decision below may be erroneous, it has not fulfilled its purpose"), 
53. On rare occasions, the Court may grant a petition to prevent a grave miscarriage of 
justice. See, e.g., McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice 
Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REV. 5, 13 & n.14 (1949). 
54. See note 38 supra. 
55. The discussion here relates only to cases within the Court's certiorari jurisdiction. Dif-
ferent issues may be involved in cases within the Court's obligatory appeals jurisdiction. See 
note 57 in.fra. 
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view through writ of certiorari, however slim, still constitutes part of 
a full opportunity to litigate because the Supreme Court determines 
the rights and duties of particular parties in cases it reviews. But the 
Court only incidentally determines these rights and duties as it set-
tles the law in the context of an actual controversy. Supreme Court 
decisions affect particular litigants because few parties would other-
wise petition for certiorari, and the Court relies on dissatisfied liti-
gants to bring questions before it.56 Furthermore, the Court needs 
interested litigants to advance the most persuasive arguments on 
both sides of the issues presented. When litigants lack that interest 
- in moot cases, for example - the Court will not decide the case. 
Supreme Court decisions therefore determine rights and duties of 
particular parties solely to enable th~ Court to prescribe law gener-
ally, and not to provide parties a third chance to litigate their private 
dispute. 
The central purpose of Supreme Court review suggests that lack 
of opportunity to appeal to the Supreme Court should not prevent 
collateral estoppel attaching to a lower court judgment, as long as 
the litigants had an opportunity to receive appellate review in a cir-
cuit court. The Supreme Court should therefore discard the Mun-
singwear procedure in federal cases mooted after appellate review. 
Instead, when the Court identifies as moot a case within its certiorari 
jurisdiction, it should deny the petition without vacating the lower 
court judgment.57 Even when the case is mooted after the Court 
grants the petition, the same reasoning dictates that the collateral 
estoppel effects of lower court judgments should be preserved.58 In 
56. SeeL. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 57 (1964). 
57. Disposition of moot cases within the Supreme Court's appeals jurisdiction requires a 
somewhat different analysis. Cases appealed directly from district courts, see note 47 supra, 
have had no other appellate review. In these cases, as in cases mooted before judgment by a 
circuit court, the Munsingwear procedure is appropriate. Moot cases already reviewed by a 
circuit court present a more difficult question. How the Court should dispose of these cases 
depends on the rationale for obligatory review. 
One possible justification for obligatory review of cases where a federal court of appeals 
has held a state statute repugnant to federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1976), is that Con-
gress feared that federal appeals judges would be insensitive to state concerns. See Tushnet, 
The Mandatory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court- Some Recent .Developments, 46 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 347, 352-55 (1977). If this is true, and if congressional concern was directed at the inter-
ests of individual litigants as well as the sovereignty of state legisJatures, then an appellant 
denied Supreme Court review by the mooting of his case should not be bound by the court of 
appeals judgment. 
Another possible explanation for the Court's obligatory jurisdiction over certain cases ap-
pealed from the circuit courts is that Congress decided that the issues in these cases are impor-
tant enough to warrant the Court's time and energy. If so, the difference between certiorari 
and appeals cases is that, in the former, the Court judges the importance of a case while, in the 
latter, Congress identifies entire classes of cases of sufficient importance to demand uniform, 
authoritative resolution. See id. at 358-65. If this is the rationale behind the Court's obliga-
tory appeals jurisdiction, the Court should simply dismiss appeals when they become moot. 
58. Statistically, a litigant whose petition has been granted stands a much better chance of 
winning than one whose petition is still under consideration by the Court. A majority of the 
cases that the Court reviews on the merits are reversed, see Harper & Leibowitz, What the 
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such a situation, the Court should simply dismiss the case, thereby 
leaving lower court judgments intact. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should change the procedure by which it dis-
poses of federal cases mooted after appellate review. The Munsing-
wear procedure, under which an appellate court vacates the lower 
court judgment in a moot case and remands the case for dismissal, 
prevents all collateral estoppel effects of the lower court judgment. 
That result is appropriate when mootness denies a litigant all oppor-
tunity to appeal a trial court judgment. But once a judgment is ren-
dered in a circuit court of appeals, collateral estoppel should attach 
even if mootness denies a petitioner Supreme Court review on cer-
tiorari. The purpose of Supreme Court review indicates that it is a 
step beyond the "full and fair opportunity to litigate" required 
before collateral estoppel can apply. 
In prop9sing a new procedure in Velsicol, the Government recog-
nized the loss of judicial resources and the unfairness to respondents 
caused by the Munsingwear procedure. But instead of arguing that 
the requirements of collateral estoppel are satisfied short of Supreme 
Court review, the Government urged the Court to consider the 
"certworthiness" of moot cases, and to allow collateral estoppel in 
moot cases where the petition for certiorari would have been denied. 
The Velsicol procedure is seriously flawed, for it achieves the judicial 
economy of collateral estoppel in the lower courts only by requiring 
greater efforts from the Supreme Court. This Note suggests a rem-
edy for that flaw: since collateral estoppel can fairly attach to an 
appeals court judgment even where mootness has prevented 
Supreme Court review, the Supreme Court should simply deny cer-
tiorari in federal cases mooted after review by a circuit court. And if 
the petition for certiorari has already been granted, the Court should 
simply dismiss the case.59 
Supreme Court .Did Not .Do .During the 1952 Term, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 427, 447-48 (1954), 
while only a small fraction of petitions are approved for review, see note 38 supra. In neither 
case, however, has a petitioner been denied an element of a full and fair opportunity to litigate. 
59. Throughout this Note, it has been assumed that if the Court merely denies or dismisses 
certiorari in a moot case, a later court will allow full collateral estoppel effect to attach to the 
earlier lower court judgment unless other considerations warrant an exception. See RESTATE-
MENT 2D, supra note 13, at§ 68.1. An alternative approach would be to limit the collateral 
estoppel effect, allowing preclusion at the district and circuit court levels, but permitting the 
Supreme Court to consider and decide the issue in a later case involving the same parties. This 
approach, however, would require the Supreme Court, in deciding the later case, to review the' 
record in the earlier case. 
